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STATEMENT OF THE CA$E 
A. Jurisdiction and Issues. Assuming that Mangum!s 
Statement of Jurisdiction intended to cite Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(c), 
the City is satisfied with the allegation of jurisdiction, and 
it will accept the Statement of Issues as set out by Mangum 
because it is his perception of those issues that gives rise to 
the appeal in the first instance. 
B. Recitation of Facts. Mangum1s statement of the facts 
is not objective or accurate in certain particulars. For 
example, whether the police made proper inquiry of the 
Defendant is the first issue on appeal, according to Mangum's 
Statement of Issues, and yet in the second paragraph on Page 3 
it is given as a fact that proper inquiry was not made of the 
Defendant by the police. 
Th$ evidence shows that during the early morning hours of 
October 25, 1987, the police responded to a "peeping torn" 
report, and in fact the reporting party described the actions 
of the Suspected peeper to the police dispatcher who relayed 
them to police officers as they arrived at the sc^ne itself. 
(Tr. p.27, 1. 9-10, 1.18-20; p.34, 1.5-11). Standing alone in 
a dark Qarport adjacent to the area where the peeper was 
sighted, the officers encountered the Defendant dressed in the 
manner described by the reporting party. (Tr. p.28 1.4-9; 
p.27 1.5-7; p.28 1.16-18). The officers explained their 
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mission and the Defendant gave an account of his actions, (Tr. 
p. 29 1.9-14). The Defendant's explanation denied any peeping, 
but it did acknowledge that he had "looked at some houses that 
he had worked on out there'1. The Defendant was later joined by 
his brother and the officers left him thejre, at the home of his 
brother, after the investigation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS) 
After an eyewitness report of the actions and description 
of a man in a backyard at a very late hour peeping in a window, 
a police officer located the Defendant alone, in the dark, at a 
carport adjacent to the site of the peeping. The police had a 
right to measure the credibility of his account with the 
yardstick of information and circumstances already known to 
them in order to determine whether the account was reasonable 
and credible or not. An arrest need not take place at the time 
of the incident, and a defendant need not be taken into custody 
if he is in a place and with others that should dispel any 
alarm or concern about further occurrence of unlawful acts. 
The evidence presented in the lower court was sufficient to 
support the judgment of that court, and Mangum has not borne 
the burden of showing error or abuse of discretion by the trial 
court which would provide basis for overturning its judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ADEQUATE INQUIRY WAS MADE OF THE DEFENDANT BY THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER 
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Sec. 76-9-703, Utah Code Annotated, contemplates such 
inquiry by the law enforcement official as will produce an 
explanation of the suspect's conduct and purpose for being in 
the area. While the testifying officer did not state that 
inquiry in his exact words as used on the night in question, he 
advised the court that they "told him what (they) were there 
for". (Tr. p. 29 1.10). The trial court is justified in 
concluding from that statement that the officer made known to 
Mangum that they suspected him of peeping and had come to 
ascertain if their suspicions were correct. In any event, it 
produced an account by Mangum, as he denied peeping but advised 
that he had been in the backyards of the homes in order to look 
at a house he had worked on at some prior time. (Tr. p.29, 
1.13-14). 
As stated in 1984 by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
a case arising out of this state, Harmon City, Inc. vs. United 
States, 733 F.2d 1381, at 1385: 
"Where the trial is to the court, the resolution of 
factual issues and conflicting evidence remains 
solely within the province of the district court. 
Such findings of a trial court, even those involving 
evaluation of expert testimony, cannot be disturbed 
on appeal unless found to be clearly erroneous. 
(Cases cited)" 
The determination of the lower court that sufficient inquiry 
was made by the police officer and that it elicited the 
required accounting should not be disturbed on appeal. The 
need for an inquiry would be a matter of law, but where there 
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was an inquiry, its adequacy would be a question of fact. 
Determination of that fact question by the trier of fact, even 
in a criminal case, is not properly the subject of review by an 
appellate court. Jackson vs. Virginia (1979, U.S.) 61 L.Ed.2d 
560, 99 S.Ct. 2781. 
II. REASONABLENESS AND CREDIBILITY OF MANGUMfS ACCOUNT OF 
HIS CONDUCT OR PURPOSE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DISPEL 
ALARM. 
The police officer's evaluation of the reasonableness 
and credibility of Mangum's account is certainly a question of 
fact. The facts already known to him establish that alarm 
existed in the minds of certain of the residents of the 
neighborhood. (Tr. p.26 1.23; p.27 1.3^5. In addition to the 
very late hour, the facts known to the officer included 
"peeking in the windows11 and "running behind (the) house". In 
that known context, the officer was required to evaluate 
Mangum's account and adjudge its credibility. The fact that 
Mangum had been hunting earlier in the day did not in any way 
account for his presence alone in a dark carport at 1:30 a.m., 
and the further statement that he had been back "look(ing) at 
some houses that he had worked on out there" could very easily 
have been determined by the officer to be inadequate and not 
credible. Surrounding circumstances, such as the description 
of Mangum and his clothing by the neighbor who observed the 
peeking, and footprints by the officer that led through the mud 
in the area of the merging and unfenced backyards were also 
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properly used by the officer in evaluating the credibility and 
reasonableness of Mangum's explanation of his presence and 
actions there. These were presented to the court and used as a 
part of the basis for the court's decision, along with other 
evidenciary matters and opportunities for the court to hear and 
observe witnesses. The denial of Mangum and his allegation 
that the officers wouldn't give him a proper hearing at the 
scene were only a part of the evidence which the court had 
before it for consideration. 
III. FAILURE OF THE OFFICER TO TAKE MANGUM INTO CUSTODY OR 
OTHERWISE REMOVE HIM FROM THE AREA DOES NOT NEGATE 
ALARM. 
As Mangum was at his brotherfs home (a next door 
neighbor), and because he was subsequently joined by his 
brother and sister-in-law, there was good reason for the 
officer to believe that Mangum would not again go into the 
interior of the block where the backyards merged or do further 
peeping. The secretive nature of that particular occupation is 
one that makes it unlikely to reoccur once the spotlight of 
notoriety has been focused upon it. The evidence showed that 
the officers had contact with the adjoining neighbor who, with 
her daughter, had evidenced the alarm, and he was satisfied 
that the alarm had abated without necessity of removing Mangum 
from the neighborhood. Under the facts that existed, the 
officer's decision to not remove Mangum was no evidence that 
the alarm required by Sec. 76-9-703, UCA, had not previously 
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existed. 
IV. IT WAS NOT ERROR OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT TO FIND ON THE EVIDENCE THAT MANGUM HAD BEEN 
PROVEN GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
A. The factfinder found that the evidence adequately 
established Mangum as the peeping party observed by the 
witness. The witness had observed the peeper there immediately 
prior to the officers finding Mangum. (Tr. p.27 1.18-21). They 
did not see anyone else in that area. (Tr. p.32 1.13-15). 
Mangum1s brother came out later, but the witnesses all agreed 
that he was dressed quite differently than Mangum himself. The 
witness described his clothing, and the only discrepancy was 
that she believed he was wearing a dark parka when in fact he 
was wearing a blue cap. The only other persons in the area 
appeared later, and either wore a police uniform or, in the 
case of Mangum1s brother, were dressed very differently. The 
eyewitness, Mrs. Hintze, saw Mangum when the police officers 
were talking to him and definitely confirmed that it was the 
man she had previously observed behind the houses and peeping. 
(Tr. p.12 1.16-18). Again, the trial court had unique 
opportunity to evaluate the testimony of the various witnesses, 
and it determined that adequate identification of Mangum had 
been made. 
B. Where there is substantial evidence to support the 
trial court's judgment, it should be upheld on appeal. This 
has been held by the courts to mean that the finding of fact by 
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the trial court must be clearly erroneous, leaving the 
appellate court with the definite and firm conviction that 
undisputed evidence in the record compels a contrary factual 
conclusion. However, reversal is not appropriate unless that 
judgment is found to be clearly erroneous, since the trial 
judge who heard and saw witnesses is first and best judge of 
the weight and value to be given to all evidence, and it is the 
trial judge who determines credibility of witnesses. Smith vs. 
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (1980, CAlO) 614 F.2d 720; Brigham 
Young University vs. Lillywhite (CAlO) 118 F.2d 836, 137 A.L.R. 
598, cert. den. 314 U.S. 638, 62L.Ed.2d 512, 62 S.Ct. 73. It 
is the trial court, and not the appellate court, which must be 
convinced of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
People vs. Robillard, 55 Cal.2d 88, 10 Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 
295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086, cert. den. 365 U.S. 886, 6 L.Ed.2d 199, 
81 S.Ct. 1043. The evidence presented in the lower court will 
be viewed by the appellate court in such manner as to support 
the decision appealed from where this is reasonably possible; 
in other words, the evidence and the reasonable inferences 
arising therefrom must be considered in the light most 
favorable to the City. Austad vs. Austad, 2 Ut.2d 49, 269 P.2d 
284, 48 A.L.R.2d 256. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence taken as a whole affords adequate basis for 
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the trial court's finding of guilty on the part of Mangum. 
Clear sighting was had by a witness over a period of time, this 
was communicated at length to the police department by 
telephone as the events took place, Mangum was found at the 
scene without reasonable explanation as to his activities, and 
the eyewitness identified him as the prowler she had seen. if 
Mangum1s account of his conduct had been reasonable or 
credible, his appeal would have some merit, but it is not 
reasonable to go through the interior of a block after midnight 
to look at a house one had worked on, and Mangum1s statement to 
that effect was not plausible in the light of surrounding 
circumstances known to the officer. The trial court properly 
found the Defendant guilty based upon its application of the 
facts as it found them to the ordinance under which Mangum was 
charged. 
DATED this 9th day of May, 198J 
S€. George City Attorney 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of 
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V, Lowry Snow, Esq. 
Snow & Jensen 
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Secretary 
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